We owe strangers more than politeness: two arguments from cosmopolitanism

Most of us feel stronger duties to family and friends than to people far away whom we will never meet. That is natural, and most moral views allow it. The harder question is whether we owe distant strangers anything at all beyond not harming them.

Cosmopolitanism is the family of views holding that all human beings belong to a single moral community, whatever their nationality. Two arguments are worth considering. The first is about equal worth: if every person matters equally, then geography alone is a weak reason to ignore someone's urgent needs. The second is about connection: global trade, communication and climate tie our lives together, so our choices already affect strangers.

We think these arguments establish at least a modest duty: to help when the cost to us is small and the benefit to others is large, and to avoid contributing to serious harm far away.

The objection is that partiality is part of what gives life meaning, and that institutions, not individuals, are the right carriers of such duties. Both points have force and deserve careful answers.

What would change our mind: an argument that explains why distance, by itself, makes a real moral difference.